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I. INTRODUCTION

From Locke to Leiter, philosophers have debated the proper governmental
posture toward believers and groups of believers.' The First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, grounded comfortably in Locke's philosophy,2 provides that
there may be "no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof ...

This text, which constrains the application of

governmental force in all forms at all levels,4 places significant limits on
governmental coercion with respect to religious practices in America. Scholars
have explored these limits in a wide variety of areas, but surprisingly few have

1. See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Univ. of
Tex. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 100, 2006), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=904640 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Kent Greenawalt is a particularly
insightful modem scholar writing on this issue. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: VOLUME I: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS (2006); KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN

PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (2005); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).

2. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1430-31 (1990).
3. U.S. CONST. amend I; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as
a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
4. Of course, the text of the First Amendment reads "Congress shall make no law..." (emphasis
added), but the Supreme Court has applied the amendment to the states through operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
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devoted much sustained thought to the Constitution's intersection with
governmental power in a pervasive and intrusive form: taxation. This article fills
this perceived hole in the scholarship.
It is a propitious moment for such a project. As a general rule, tax-exempt
charities are prohibited from intervening in political campaigns.5 In response to a
sharp spike in complaints about political activity in tax-exempt charities in
connection with the 2004 presidential election,6 the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) investigated political activity in forty churches.7 The investigation into a
sermon at All Saints Episcopal Church in Pasadena, California, was especially
newsworthy.8 A few days before the 2004 election, Reverend George F. Regas, a
priest at All Saints, gave a sermon in which he imagined a debate between Jesus
Christ and then-candidates George W. Bush and John F. Kerry.' Bush did not
come out the victor of this debate-not by a long shot.' The sermon attracted the
attention of the IRS, which commenced an investigation into whether the church
had intervened in the campaign in violation of the conditions of its federal
income tax exemption." During the investigation, the IRS delivered a summons
to the church for records and testimony; All Saints declined to respond to the
summons and vowed to challenge it in court. 2 The dispute is ongoing as of this
writing.
More activity on this front seems certain: although the IRS has developed
new internal procedures' 3 and has issued new guidelines for charities regarding
5. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2006).
6. See Stephanie Strom, IRS Finds Sharp Increase in Illegal Political Activity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2006, at A8.
7.

2004 POLITICAL ACTIVITY COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (PACI), SUMMARY OF RESULTS (Feb. 16, 2006),

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/one-page-statistics.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also IRS
Warns Churches to Avoid Campaigning,POL. NEWS, JULY 18, 2006, http://political-news.org/breaking/26289/
irs-warns-churches-to-avoid-campaigning.htnl (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Although thirty-seven
churches were found to have engaged in political activity, there were no penalties for any church beyond a

written advisory notice or excise tax. Id.
8. E.g., Mark A. Muntean, Preserving the Saints: IRS vs. All Saints Church, 109 TAx NOTES 1691 (Dec.
26, 2005); Church Ready to Fight IRS, CBS NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2005/11/16/eveningnews/main1051602.shtml (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Steve Dunn, Beware of
the IRS Spook in the Next Pew, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 15, 2005, at B 1;Katie Strickland, Churches Shouldn't
Be Tax-Exempt, DAILY BRUIN, Nov. 16, 2005, http://www.dailybruin.ucla.edu/news/articles.asp?id=34990 (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review); Patricia Ward Biederman & Jason Felch, Antiwar Sermon Brings IRS
Warning, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, at Al; Donald B. Tobin, Politics and Religion-Bad Bed Fellows?,
http://taxprof.typepad.comtaxprof-blog/files/tobin essay.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
9. George F. Regas, If Jesus Debated President Bush and Senator Kerry, http://www.allsaintspas.org/archives/sermons/(10-31-04)%20lf%2oJesus%2ODebated.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2007) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
10. Id.
11. Biederman & Felch, supra note 8, at Al.
12. Louis Sahagun, Church Votes to Fight FederalProbe, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at Bi.
13. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007 I.R.B. LEXIS 495, *25; POLITICAL ACTIVITY COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE
(PACI), PROCEDURES FOR 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/paci-procedures-

feb_222006.pdf. (last visited Apr. 18, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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their political activity, some churches have not gotten the message.'5 Congress,
for its part, considered a bill that would have reversed current law and permitted
religious securities to retain their exemptions despite political pronouncements of
pastors from the pulpit. 6 Amid this activity at the federal level, state governments
are putting renewed pressure on the property tax exemptions offered to nonprofit
organizations, including churches. 7
The tax preferences granted to religious organizations are quite consequential. Tax-exempt financing for religious organizations totaled at least $20
billion from 1995-2005." 8 The income from these organizations, if taxed, would
generate billions of dollars for federal and state coffers. Moreover, the property
tax exemption granted by every state to religious organizations is also worth
untold billions: in Colorado alone, tax-exempt real estate is valued at over $1
billion.' 9 If one accepts the prevailing scholarly view that a tax exemption is
properly viewed as a subsidy, 20 the income and property tax exemptions religious
organizations receive are, in the aggregate, surely among the largest of all
government subsidies. 2' Thus, the tax exemption granted to religious
organizations is a timely and important object of scholarly attention.
Whether religious organizations should (or should not) be exempt from generally
applicable property and income taxes is a two-step inquiry. First, one must determine

whether the U.S. Constitution permits states and the federal government to impose
taxes on religious organizations. In other words, can the government tax religious
organizations? The second question is: should the government impose taxes on
religious organizations? This article refers to the first question as the "capability
question" and the second as the "justification question." If either question is
14. IRS, Election Year Activities and the Prohibition on Political Campaign Intervention for Section
501(c)(3) Organizations, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154712,00.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
15. See Separation of Church and State and Tax Exemptions, WASH. POST, June 1, 2007, at A4; Frederic
J. Frommmer, Bachman Endorsement Protested: Pastor's Remark Spurs Complaint to IRS, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Oct. 18, 2006, at B3; Stephanie Strom, Watchdog Group Accuses Churches of Political Action, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006, at A19.
16. Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, H.R. 235, 108th Cong. (1 st Sess. 2003).
17. E.g., Jane Gordon, Playing Tough with the Tax-Exempt, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2006, at 14CN, 1.
18. Diana B. Henriques, A Religious Program Expands, Disputes Rise Over Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2006, at Al.
19. Id. (noting that national figures are unavailable).
20. The Supreme Court, for its part, has been a bit schizophrenic on this point. Compare Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) ("The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government
does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state."), with Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) ("[T]ax exemptions... are a
form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a
cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income."), and Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 590 (1997) ("There is a constitutionally
significant difference between subsidies and tax exemptions.").
21. The religious exemption may rival the cash subsidies to farmers which, under a 2002 bill, amounts to
an estimated $190 billion over ten years. Bush Signs $190 Billion Farm Bill, CNN.COM, May 13, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLMCS/05/13/farm.bill/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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answered in the negative, religious organizations should remain tax-exempt. Only if
both questions are answered in the affirmative could the government rightly impose a
tax on religious organizations. Obviously, the more interesting and difficult question
is whether the government should tax religious organizations. However, for two
reasons, I will examine only the capability question in this article.
First, it seems right, at least in this case, that "ought implies can." This idea,
associated with Kant, has been taken to mean that "it would be morally wrong to
insist that an agent ought to do a certain action, if he is or is thought to be unable to
do so.''22Applied in this context, one cannot rightly criticize a government for not
taxing religious organizations if the government is constitutionally prohibited from
doing do-even if the government would otherwise have a good reason tax religious
organizations. Therefore, because the capability question is ethically prior to, if not
logically prior to, the justification question, it makes sense to examine the capability
question first.
Second, analyzing the capability question first might save a great deal of time
and effort. As noted above, if the answer to either the capability or the justification
question is no, the entire inquiry can end. Given a choice, it is preferable to examine
the easier question first and thereby ascertain whether it is possible to avoid the more
difficult question altogether. The justification question is a complex and difficult
question of political philosophy. A full exploration of it would likely require a
moderately thorough examination of plausible theories of equality to determine
which, if any, support the tax policy principle of horizontal equity.23 Then it would
require an elaborate discussion to ascertain whether religious organizations are
situated differently enough from ordinary taxable organizations to merit tax
exemption. The justification question, in other words, is sufficiently complicated to
warrant an effort to avoid tackling it at all if possible. The capability question, in
contrast, is a straightforward (but not easy) descriptive question of constitutional law
and is the question examined in this article.
Moreover, some truly great scholars have grappled recently with the problem
of exempting individuals and organizations from generally applicable laws on
religious grounds.24 Although there may be unique consequential considerations
with respect to the tax exemption of religious organizations, considerations of
principle are not likely to differ greatly among bodies of law. So the works of

22. See, e.g., William K. Frankena, Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy, in ESSAYS
IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 40, 60 (A.I. Melden ed., 1958); IMMANUEL KANT, Religion Within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason, in RELIGION AND RATIONAL THEOLOGY 94 (Allen W. Wood & George di Giovanni trans. & ed.,

1996) ("[I]f the moral law commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that
we must be capable of being better human beings.").
23. The term "horizontal equity" refers to the idea that similarly situated individuals and entities should
shoulder similar tax burdens. See generally David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24
Yale L. & Pol. Rev. 43 (2006).
24. E.g., GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1;Jeremy Waldron, One Law
forAll? The Logic of CulturalAccommodation, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2002).
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other scholars on the philosophy of religious exemption may be consulted on the
justification question. I have no reason to believe I would advance the debate.
This article, then, is a purely doctrinal endeavor. It discusses the question
whether, under current constitutional law, the federal or state governments may
tax a religious organization. This question has never been squarely before the
U.S. Supreme Court, and it has been several years since the last academic
speculation.25 This article teases out of the U.S. Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence eight principles that limit the government's power to
tax religious organizations. It states those principles and contemplates their
practical significance. The most important, and likely the most controversial, is
the conclusion drawn, from the Court's doctrine, that it would be unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause for the government to impose a full-scale income
tax (like the one established by the current Internal Revenue Code) on religious
organizations.
The limited scope of this article must be very clear. This article has a purely
descriptive aim: it describes whether and how religious organizations may be
taxed under current constitutional law as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court.
It does not explore the question of whether the Constitution's true semantic
content or spirit precludes taxation of religious organizations. Rather, this article
seeks to explain how the Court, given its own precedent, should deal with taxes
on religious organizations. 26 It takes no position on either the wisdom of the
Court's jurisprudence or the desirability of taxing religious organizations.
Accordingly, one must not mistake a conclusion that Supreme Court doctrine
permits the government to tax religious organizations for a conclusion that the
Court has interpreted the Constitution correctly. Similarly, one must not conclude
that the government should tax religious organizations whenever it can
constitutionally do so. It may be that, even if it were constitutional for the
government to tax a church, it would either be wrong in principle or
consequentially undesirable to do so. The normative question-which is much
more difficult and intricate than the descriptive question-is not addressed in this
article. This article is concerned only with determining whether, and how, the
government can tax religious organizations in a manner consistent with Supreme
Court doctrine.
The following discussion is simple in structure. Part II will introduce the
historical background and statutory framework of the various tax exemptions for
religious organizations. Part II1 will lay out applicable constitutional principles

25. See Glenn Goodwin, Would Caesar Tax God? The Constitutionality of Governmental Taxation of
Churches, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 383 (1985); Oliver S. Thomas, The Power to Destroy: The Eroding Constitutional
Arguments for Church Tax Exemption and the Practical Effect on Churches, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 605 (1992).
26. Its method is similar to, but somewhat more normative than, that stated by Justice Holmes in his
famous Harvard Law Review article: "The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
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and will then critically analyze three arguments that the U.S. Constitution
protects religious organizations from the government's taxing power: (1) taxing
religious organizations is incompatible with the concept of sovereignty, (2) the
Free Exercise Clause requires the government to exempt religious organizations
from tax, and (3) a tax on religious organizations violates the Establishment
Clause. This analysis will mine the Court's cases for maxims that constrain the
legislature's taxing power. Part IV explicitly states these principles:
1. Religious organizations must be subject to the same rules as other
organizations;
2. A tax must not have the purpose of promoting or inhibiting religion;
3. A tax must be imposed on religious organizations at the same rate as
that imposed on other similarly situated organizations;
4. No tax may operate as a prior restraint on religious activity;
5. The government may not make excessive inquiry into the religious
nature of a use or product;
6. There should be appropriate statutory limits on the discretion to
audit;
7. Any tax must not be onerous; and
8. A full-scale income tax on churches is constitutionally impermissible.
Part V explores the implications of those principles for current law and
concludes that (1) the Internal Revenue Code in effect today is entirely
constitutional; (2) the section 501(c)(3) limitations on political and commercial
activity are constitutional; (3) a typical property tax would not be unconstitutional as applied to religious organizations; and (4) the unrelated business
income tax is constitutional. Part VI offers some concluding remarks.
This article has important theoretical and practical payoffs. Theoretically,
this article helps to clarify the source of the income tax exemption for religious
organizations by introducing and describing the distinction between statutory tax
exemption and constitutional tax exemption. By making clear exactly what
Congress has given and exactly what the Constitution has given, this distinction
makes possible a richer and more nuanced theoretical picture of the tax exempt
universe.
Practically, this distinction clarifies the locus and stakes of the debate
regarding the proper contours of the Code's exemption regime. The debate is not
about whether religious organizations should be exempt from the federal income
tax, for religious organizations must be exempt. Correlatively, at stake in any
proposed change to the Code is not religious organizations' exemption-the
exemption itself is safe from congressional tinkering. In this light, the All Saints
Episcopal Church dispute can be seen for what it truly is: a dispute not about
whether All Saints will be income tax exempt but about whether the donors to
All Saints may continue to deduct their contributions and whether All Saints may
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issue tax-exempt bonds. In this broader context, the important issues for political
resolution become (1) what sorts of income tax benefits should be granted to
donors and creditors of religious organizations, and (2) what conditions should
the donee organization have to satisfy to secure these tax benefits?2 7 This simple
but significant shift of perspective should inform further academic and political
debate at the intersection of tax and religion.
II. BACKGROUND

The practice of exempting religious organizations from taxes has existed for
so long and in so many societies that it no longer seems to require justification.2829
One commentator concluded that there was "no time... churches were taxed;,
another concluded that "tax exemption of church property is probably as ancient
as taxation itself."3 ° Although governments have generally exempted religion
from taxes, their reasons for doing so have varied through the ages. Part II is a
high-level overview of the evolving rationale for and substance of religiouslybased tax exemption. Section A demonstrates that the exemption has its earliest
roots in superstition. Section B describes the theoretical basis for the exemption
under British common law and equity, state-sponsored religion and community
benefit. Section C recounts the extinction of state-sponsored religion as a
theoretical support for tax exemption in the United States after the ratification of
the First Amendment and traces the rise of the community benefit theory. Section
D describes the federal tax benefits conferred on religious organizations.
A. Ancient Origins
Religiously-based tax exemption has its roots in the superstitious notion that
a god (or the gods) would punish humanity for appropriating that which was
consecrated to it (or them). The earliest recorded exemption dates back to 2169
B.C. in ancient Babylon.3 As the philosopher-historian Will Durant recounts, the
King of Babylon expropriated priests' property in emergencies, but "this was rare
and dangerous, for the priests had laid terrible curses upon all who should touch,
unpermitted, the smallest jot of ecclesiastical property. 32 In India, by
comparison, the King would not tax Hindu clerics practicing the Vedic rites, the
Srotriyas, even in emergencies, because it was believed that when "provoked to
27. See infra Part V.
28. Cf JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 226 (1995) ("[Tlhe
core rationale for religious exemption has seldom been questioned."). But see Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86, 88 (1853)
("It is easier to admire the motives for [a religious tax] exemption than to justify it by any sound argument.").
29. DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 5 (1977).
30. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 210 (1967).
31. John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 22
CUMB. L. REV. 521, 524 (1992).
32. WILL DURANT, OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 234 (1954).
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anger[, the clerics] can instantly destroy the king and all his army by reciting
curses and mystical texts.

B.

33

The British and Colonial Backdrop

Under English law, all property was presumptively subject to taxation.' 4
However, religious property was tax-exempt at common law and in equity. Yet
because the exemption was granted for different reasons in each court, the scope
of the exemption differed in each court.
1. The Common Law
In 1534, the Act of Supremacy granted the King of England the power to
correct "all manner of errors, heresies, [and] schisms. 35 This Act merged church
and state in England and made the English monarch the official head of the
church. Thus, the Crown exercised sovereign authority over both government and
religion for hundreds of years and, for much of that time, retained tight control
over the church and its doctrine.36

As an entity of the state, churches were not subject to tax. Churches were
tax-exempt not because religion was thought to be worthy of promotion or
because of the charitable works performed by churches. Rather, churches were
tax-exempt for the same reason prisons and courthouses were tax-exempt: a tax
on them would be redundant-the government would be taxing itself.3 7 Churches
were state agencies and "[b]y devoting their properties to the religious uses ... [,
churches] were discharging the state's responsibility for the established
religion. 38 On these grounds, the common law specifically exempted churches
from taxation.
However, the common law exemption was subject to three important
limitations. First, only state-sponsored institutions discharging state functions
were exempt; vacant church-owned property-and the property of any dissenting
religion, regardless of use-was taxable.3 9 Second, property devoted to religious
use was exempt only from the taxes used to support and maintain the church; 40 a

33. Id. at 485.
34. John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional
Practice?,64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 371, 375 (1991).
35. 1 Eliz., c.1, § 8 (1534).
36. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 21-22 (2002). Although at
present the British Crown is not particularly active in church government, the Church of England still formally
acknowledges the Crown's supreme authority. See THE CANONS OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 9 (6th ed. 2000),
http://www.cofe.anglican.org/about/churchlawlegis/canons/whole.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
37. Carl Zollmann, Tax Exemptions ofAmerican Church Property, 14 MICH. L. REV. 646,648 (1916).
38. Witte, supra note 34, at 375.
39. Id. at 372-73.
40. Id. at 373.
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whole array of other taxes were imposed on church property, including "quitrents, poll taxes, land taxes, ... and other occasional rates on realty and
personalty ... ,,4'Third, the entire exemption could be suspended in times of
crisis. For example, during King Phillip's War in New England and Bacon's
Rebellion in the South, the exemptions for church property were revoked.42 In
light of these limitations, "[a] universal exemption.., from all property taxes
appears to have been the exception rather than the rule ' 43 under the common law.
2.

The Equity Tradition

As was the case at common law, all property was presumptively taxable in
courts of equity." The Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 overrode that
presumption for a broad range of charitable uses, including religious uses. 4 The
equity rationale differed from the common law rationale. The government
granted the common law exemption because religious organizations discharged a
state responsibility; courts granted the equity exemption because of the broadbased social benefit charities provided. As John Witte put it, "equity courts
exempted church properties from taxation not because of the 'religious uses' but
because of the 'charitable uses' to which they were devoted. Church property
could be exempted at equity only to the extent it was used 'charitably.' 46 Thus,
religious entities could be exempt from tax in courts of law as a religious
organization, exempt in courts of equity as a charitable organization, or exempt
in one court but not the other. To illustrate, only denominations approved by the
Crown were exempt at common law, but all churches-even those not approved
by the Crown (e.g., Quakers and Catholics)-could receive the charitable
exemption at equity, provided that such churches rendered charitable services to
the community.4 ' To this extent, the equitable exemption was broader than the
common law exemption.
C. The Colonies and States
Under British rule, the American colonies continued the practice of
exempting churches from taxes.4 s After independence, most states provided that
common law and equity were to remain in force until repealed or altered by the

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 374 n.44.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 375.
43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601), repealed by 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 42, § 13 (1888); see also C. CROWTHER,

RELIGIOUS TRUSTS: THEIR DEVELOPMENT, SCOPE AND MEANING (1954).

46.
47.
48.

Witte, supra note 34, at 375.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 371-372 (describing the policies of England and its colonies).
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legislature. 49 Consequently, churches remained tax-exempt both at common law
and in equity, and sometimes by statute. °
In many states, religion continued to be perceived as a state responsibility,5 '
considered "as much a municipal corporation as the town" itself. 2 Consistent
with such a perception, several states prohibited Catholics, Jews, and atheists
from holding public office.53 More relevant to this discussion, some states levied
taxes, sometimes by constitutional fiat,54 to support and maintain Protestant
churches of approved denominations." Churches in these states were, therefore,
nontaxable for the same reason that they were nontaxable in Elizabethan
England, namely, they "performed activities that government would otherwise be
forced to undertake. 56 This is not to say that there were no limitations on the
exemption. On the contrary, some limitations were quite significant. For
example, it was common to require that exempt property actually be used for
religious purposes.57 Thus, a vacant lot or rental property was taxable even if

49. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art 25 (1776); MASS. CONST. pt. I, ch. VI, art. VI (1780); N.H. CONST. art.
XC (1792); N.J. CONST. § 22 (1776); S.C. CONST. art. VII (1790).
50. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 682 n.3 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
51. It was thought, quite reasonably, that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause applied only to
Congress. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
(emphasis added)). As stated in note 4 supra, the amendment's religion clauses were later applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Massachusetts, for one, continued to use tax money to support
establishments of religion. See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. III (1780) (authorizing local governments to tax citizens
to fund religious teachings). It continued to do so until well into the nineteenth century. Barnes v. First Parish in
Falmouth, 6 Mass. 401, 417-18 (1810) ("[A]ll citizens except Quakers are obligated to contribute to the support
of [religious] teachers."). The legislature did not see a need for a statute granting property tax exemption until
1837. All Saints Parish v. Brookline, 59 N.E. 1003, 1005 (Mass. 1901) (Barker, J., dissenting) ("For a period of
216 years the doctrine that the churchyard and the church were public works was of itself sufficient to secure
for them an unbroken exemption from taxation. Until April 1, 1836, there was no statutory exemption of land or
building. Yet neither was taxed, and for the same reason which, without any statutory declaration, to this day
has exempted court houses, jails, houses of correction, school houses, town houses, and city halls, with their
grounds, and also highways, canals, and land and structures within the location of railroads.").
52. Zollmann, supra note 37.
53. Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A
Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 681-87 (1987) (discussing religious test
practices in pre-Constitution America). The constitutional prohibition against religious tests applied only to
officers of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
54. See MASS. CONST. pt. 1,art. I1 (1780) (authorizing local governments to tax citizens to fund
religious teachings).
55. Witte, supra note 34, at 371.
56. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 69 (2003);
Carl Zollmann, Religious Charitiesin the American Law, 7 MARQ. L. REV. 131 (1922-1923).
57. See Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 407 (1886) ("But land which is neither actually
occupied for a church building nor ...used for the convenient enjoyment of the building of as a church, is not
exemption from taxation."); First Congregational Church of De Kalb v. Bd. of Review of De Kalb County, 98
N.E. 275, 279 (11. 1912) (holding that a parsonage was not exempt under a Constitution that required a
"religious use"). But see All Saints Parish v. Brookline, 59 N.E. 1003, 1004 (Mass. 1901) (holding that only the
portion of a churchyard used for a church was exempt from taxation).
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owned by a church.58 In states where religion was not seen as a state
responsibility, churches remained tax-exempt as charities for the reasons
articulated in equity to justify the charitable exemption provided by the Statute of
Uses and with similar limitations of scope.59
As the nineteenth century progressed, however, church-state separation
became a well-established principle nationwide. "[P]eople woke up to the fact
that the exemptions given to church property rested on a custom the reason for
6
which had disappeared."
S 61 Even President Grant called for reconsideration of the
religious tax exemption. It was no longer useful for proponents of exemption to
argue that churches discharged a state responsibility once much of the public
accepted the idea that the government could not establish religion. Thus,
proponents of exemption adopted the equity rationale and pointed out the broad
benefit religious organizations confer on society. In this debate, proponents of
exemption credited religion with a multitude of virtues: inculcating public
spiritedness and moral uprightness, fostering democratic principles and participation, decreasing urban blight, and encouraging submission to political
authority. 62 This beneficial coexistence was said to justify the exemption. 6 At the
same time, proponents argued that churches should be exempt because they
performed some quasi-governmental functions through their charitable activities,
such as education and relief to the poor.64 Courts accepted this hybrid theory of
social benefit and quid pro quo65 even though, as one commentator noted, it was
less a justification than a post hoc rationalization. 66
The proponents' arguments won the day decisively. By the early part of the
twentieth century, all fifty states exempted property used for religious purposes
from taxation, either by state constitution6 or by statute6 This state of affairs
continues to the present day; all fifty states and the District of Columbia exempt

58. Witte, supra note 34, at 372-73.
59. Y.M.C.A. of Omaha v. Douglas County, 83 N.W. 924, 927 (Neb. 1900) (holding that only the
portion of property devoted to charitable purposes was tax-exempt).
60. Zollmann, supra note 37, at 649.
61. 2 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966 1296-97 (Fred L. Israel ed.,
1966). Grant's position was motivated by two concerns: fairness and an eroding tax base. Id.
62. See Witte, supra note 34, at 387 & nn.81-85 (citations omitted).
63. See id. at 387.
64. Id. at 388.
65. E.g., Book Agents of Methodist Episcopal Church, S. v. Hinton, 21 S.W. 321, 322 (Tenn. 1893)
(finding that churches confer a benefit "on the public by such institutions and a consequent relief, to some
extent, of the burden upon the state to care for and advance the interests of its citizens").
66. Zollmann, supra note 37, at 647-48.
67. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 91 (1901); ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (1874); CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §
1.5 (1879); COLO. CONST. art. X, § 5 (1876); KAN. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1859); KY. CONST. § 170 (1890); LA.
CONST. § 230 (1898); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 176 (1889); S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3 (1895); UTAH CONST. XIII, §
2 (1896); VA. CONST. § 1902 (1902).
68. Often these statutory schemes were authorized or required by the state constitution. See Witte, supra
note 34, at 389 n.90.
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religious organizations from property tax. 69 Gone are the myriad limitations on
religiously based tax exemptions.
D. The FederalIncome Tax Exemption
As long as there has been a federal income tax, religious organizations have
been exempt from it.70 Today, although the Constitution empowers Congress to
tax all "incomes, from whatever source derived, ' 7' section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code (the Code) exempts from federal income taxes organizations "operated exclusively for religious ... purposes." This section raises two
key issues: (1) what is a religious purpose? and (2) what benefits does the Code
allow for, and what burdens does the Code impose on, religious organizations?
1. The Elusive Concept of Religion
The Code "conspicuously" fails to define what religious purpose is,72 leaving
it to the IRS to fill in the concept. There are at least four possible ways to define
religion. One is to attempt to define religion in a dictionary-like way, namely, to
set forth the necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper application of the
tax exemption. This would yield a comparatively determinate approach--once
the necessary conditions are identified, one simply searches for those conditions
in the facts-but it may not be the best strategy because people and institutions
may not agree on the predicate conditions. For example, some posit that belief in
a Supreme Being is necessary to religion,73 while others have denied its necessity,
looking instead for some "ultimate concern. In any event, the Supreme Court
has, at least recently,75 rejected this method of defining religion.76

69.

Michael K. Ryan, Note, A Requiem for Religiously Based Property Tax Exemptions, 89 GEO. L.J.

2139, 2139 (2001).
70. Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894) (exempting "corporations, companies, or
associations organized and conducted solely for ... religious ... purposes").

71. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
72. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 56, at 185.
73. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965) (quoting 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958)
(amended 1967)); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-634 (1931) (Huges, C.J., dissenting)
(overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946)); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)
(overruled by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
74. Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1056 (1978). For a
convincing critique of these ideas, see Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 579, 593-97.

75.
76.

Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633-634.
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
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A second approach draws on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein" and H.L.A.
Hart.7 ' This approach first identifies indisputably correct uses of the term
"religion," for example, to refer to Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. These
standard instances constitute the "core" meaning of the term. For cases falling
outside the core, one uses analogy to determine whether the term is correctly
used to refer to a set of beliefs or practices. In this way, one analogizes core uses
to penumbra uses, comparing, for example, Christianity to Scientology,
Paganism, and Marxism. There are no necessary elements, only elements that in
certain combinations may be sufficient. This approach has been advocated by
Kent Greenawalt 79 and George Freeman, 80 refined by Eduardo Pefialver, 8' and
perhaps adopted by some courts.82 However, the Supreme Court has never
explicitly endorsed this approach.
The third possible way to define religion is to look for functional
equivalence. In United States v. Seeger, the Supreme Court defined religion as
"[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of [monotheistic religions]." 83 Thus, the
Court held in Welsh v. United States that a man's beliefs informed by "history
and sociology" but by no particular religious sect were religious in nature' 4 This
approach may seem identical to the Greenawalt/Pefialver/Freeman approach, but
it is narrower. The Greenawalt/Pefialver/Freeman approach analogizes the
substance and function of beliefs and practices between core and penumbra
cases, whereas the Seeger approach analogizes to function only.
The IRS adopted none of the foregoing approaches, opting instead for a
fourth approach. For federal tax purposes, a religious organization is a group of
individuals sharing a set of sincerely held beliefs.85 I take this to mean that two
elements are necessary: (1) a set of shared, genuinely held beliefs (2) that are
honestly characterized by the taxpayer as religious in nature. The first element
concerns the substantive, or first-order, beliefs of the religion. An example of a
first-order belief is the Nicene Creed, which is a statement of beliefs recited by a
congregation in church. 6 The second element concerns the group's second-order
77.
1958).
78.

See LUDWIG

WlTITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

(G.E.M. Anscrombie trans., 3d ed.

See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Legal Classics Ed. 1990).

79. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 762-776
(1984).
80. George C. Freeman III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71
GEO. L.J. 1519, 1549-51 (1983).
81. Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALEL.J. 791, 814-22 (1997).
82. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031-33 (3d Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197,
207-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
83. 380 U.S. 163, 179 (1965).
84. 398 U.S. 341, 343 (1970).
85. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
86. We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all that is, seen
and unseen.
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beliefs-its beliefs about its beliefs. The first element simply requires a creed.
The second element is more demanding; it requires a specific and sincere belief
in the religious nature of that creed. It is this second-order belief that
distinguishes (for the IRS) religious organizations from, inter alia, political
organizations. For example, both Republicans and Catholics may subscribe to
shared sets of beliefs, but unlike Catholics, Republicans characterize those beliefs
as political, not religious. Only if the IRS is satisfied that a group's second-order
characterization of its first-order beliefs is genuine will the inquiry end and the
IRS accept the sect's claim of religiosity.87
In choosing this definition, the IRS believed it was respecting the
Establishment Clause: "An attempt to define religion, even for purposes of
statutory construction, violates the 'establishment' clause since it necessarily
delineates and, therefore, limits what can and cannot be a religion."8 But this is
incorrect. In another context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
crucial term used in the Code-"gross income"-was coterminous with its
constitutional meaning. Analogously, it is reasonable to think that Congress
incorporated the term "religion," as it is used the First Amendment, into section
501(c)(3). The Constitution almost certainly imports an objective concept of
"religion" that separates beliefs and practices that are religious in nature from
those which are not.90 If the Constitution itself endorses a particular concept of
religion, a statute incorporating that concept cannot be said to violate the
Establishment Clause. Therefore, the IRS is mistaken in holding that its
definition of religion is constitutionally required. This mistake results in a
breathtakingly wide scope for the exemption that depends almost entirely on the
We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, eternally begotten of the Father,
God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, of one Being with the
Father. Through him all things were made. For us and for our salvation he came down from heaven:
by the power of the Holy Spirit he became incarnate from the Virgin Mary, and was made man. For
our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate; he suffered death and was buried. On the third day he
rose again in accordance with the Scriptures; he ascended into heaven and is seated at the right hand
of the Father. He will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead, and his kingdom will
have no end.
We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life, who proceeds from the Father and the
Son. With the Father and the Son he is worshiped and glorified. He has spoken through the Prophets.
We believe in one holy catholic and apostolic Church. We acknowledge one baptism for the
forgiveness of sins. We look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come.
Amen.
THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 385-89 (1979).

87. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Conm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 349 U.S. 426, 429 (1955) ("This Court has frequently
stated that [the statutory] language was used by Congress to exert in this field the full measure of its taxing
power." (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
90. But see Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (stating
that what is religious "is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question").
Contra Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[Tihere can be no doubt that the
invocation of God's blessings... is a religious activity.") (internal quotations omitted).
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vagaries of the taxpayer's religious imagination. 9' Nevertheless, a broad
definition is still a definition, and it is clear what the IRS position is: religion
means whatever taxpayers say it means, as long as they mean it.
2.

The FederalTax Consequencesof Being a Religious Organization

Broadly speaking, unless otherwise limited by law, 92 there are three principal
benefits that the Code provides for religious organizations: (1) eligibility to be
exempt from federal income taxation; 93 (2) eligibility to issue bonds, subject to
certain restrictions, the interest on which is excludible from the creditor's
income; 94 and (3) eligibility to be the recipient of donations that are deductible
from the adjusted gross income of the donor.95 In addition to enjoying all of the
benefits conferred on all religious organizations, churches 96 are granted several
special benefits by the Code. 97 First, churches are relieved from the general
requirement to apply for exempt status (Form 1023). 9' Second, churches are free
from the presumption that they are private foundations in the absence of contrary
evidence. 99 Third, churches, unlike all other 501(c)(3) organizations, are not
required to file annual informational returns with the IRS (e.g., Form 990 or
Form 990PF).' °° Fourth, the Code circumscribes the IRS's discretion in auditing
churches. 0' Lastly, ministers and other employees of churches are given special
treatment with respect to retirement plans, 02 housing, 0 3 and payroll taxes.'°4

91. Of course, abuse is not often tolerated by the IRS. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 56, at 199201 and sources cited therein. Note that such cases turn on the taxpayer's lack of sincerity, not the government's
rejection of the potential truth of the taxpayer's claimed first- and second-order beliefs.
92. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4958 (imposing financial penalties on parties to an "excess benefit transaction");
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (revoking educational institution's exemption because
activities violated "a fundamental public policy"); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm'r, 823 F.2d 1310
(9th Cir. 1987) (revoking exemption on grounds of private inurement); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972) (revoking exemption for violating § 501(c)(3) prohibition of
political activity).
93. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2000).
94. See id. §§ 103(a), 141,145-49.
95. Id. § 170(a)(1).
96. The IRS has articulated a fourteen-factor test to determine which religious organizations are
churches. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Throughout
this article, the word "church" will be used in this technical sense unless the context indicates otherwise. Thus,
this article's use of the word "church" must not be understood to mean that the analysis is limited to
Christianity, or to imply that it intends to exclude other faiths.
97. See generally Wendy Gerzog Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. PITT. L. REV.
345, 355-59 (1990) (discussing some of "the benefits of being a church" under the Code).
98. I.R.C. § 508.
99. Id.
100. Id. §6033(a)(2)(A)(i).
101. Id.§7611.
102. Id. §§ 410(c)(1)(B); 41 l(e)(1)(B); 412(h)(4); 414(e).
103. Id. § 107 (allowing "ministers of the gospel" to exclude the rental value of church-provided
housing or a cash rental allowance provided by the church); id. § 256(a)(6) (allowing ministers to take mortgage
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III. WOULD A TAX ON RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION?

Although tax deductions and exemptions are usually regarded as a matter of
legislative grace and not a matter of right,' 5 many have claimed that churches are
exempt as a matter of constitutional right.' °6 This part analyzes whether the tax
exemption for religious organizations is, in fact, a matter of right and if so, to
what extent. To that end, it evaluates three different reasons that the imposition
of a tax on religious organizations might be thought unconstitutional: (1) taxing
religious organizations is incompatible with the concept of sovereignty (section
B), (2) the Free Exercise Clause requires that the government exempt religious
organizations from tax (section C), and (3) a tax on religious organizations would
violate the Establishment Clause (section D). But first, the issue is framed in
section A by briefly describing the relevant constitutional principles.
A. Basic ConstitutionalPrinciples
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the government
"shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."'0 7 Known as the
Establishment Clause, this provision prohibits "governmentally established
religion."'0 8 The First Amendment also provides that the government "shall make
no law ...

prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."°9 This provision, known as

' 0
the Free Exercise Clause, prohibits "governmental interference with religion." 1
The tension between the clauses has been widely recognized and discussed"' and
has created significant uncertainty in application. The Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged the difficulty it has had trying to "find a neutral course between
the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either
of
2
other.""
the
with
clash
to
tend
would
extreme,
logical
a
to
which, if expanded

interest and property tax deductions in addition to excluding § 107 rental exclusion). But see Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause and Should Be Declared
Unconstitutional,24 WHITtlER L. REV. 707 (2003).
104. IR.C. §§ 1402(a)(8), 1402(e) (allowing ministers to exempt themselves from self-employment tax).
105. Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
106. E.g., KELLEY, supra note 29, at 21-22 ("If any legislature undertakes to levy a tax upon the house
of worship, the churches and synagogues will fight it to the highest court. Meanwhile, if the doctrine of
'legislative grace' is not a 'fallacy' in the full sense, it is at least a 'sectarian' doctrine--one that is not accepted
by significant segments of society. ... There are those of use who do not concede that the legislature can
constitutionally tax churches .... ).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment constrains both the state and federal governments by virtue
of the 14th amendment. See Everson v. Rd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
108. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
110. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
111. See generally MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 36; F. Phillip Manns, Jr., Finding the "Free Play"
Between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 71 TENN. L. REV. 657 (2004).
112. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69.
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With respect to the taxation of religious organizations, John Witte, Jr.,

articulates the problem very nicely:
The establishment clause has been interpreted to forbid government from
imparting special benefits to religious groups. The free exercise clause
has been interpreted to forbid government from imposing special burdens
on religious groups. Neither the exemption nor the taxation of church
property appears to satisfy the principles of both clauses. To exempt
church property while taxing that of other nonreligious groups appears to
violate the "no special benefit" principle of the establishment clause. To
tax church property while exempting that of other nonprofit groups
appears to violate the "no special burden" principle of the free exercise
clause. The controversy thus falls within the terra incognita between the
religion clauses.' 13
The Supreme Court's opinions illustrate this tension. On one hand, it is clear
that the Establishment Clause does not necessarily forbid tax exemption for
religious organizations. 4 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that an
exemption for religious property would violate the Establishment Clause if drawn
too narrowly."' Similarly, although the Court indicated that a generally
applicable tax imposed on religious organizations would not violate the Free
Exercise Clause, ' 1 6 it is not clear how far this principle extends. In the absence of
definitive Supreme Court guidance, three arguments have been advanced to
support the conclusion that the government is prohibited from taxing religion.
The next three sections critically analyze those three arguments to determine
whether and how the Constitution limits the taxation of religious organizations.
B. Sovereignty
In a 1985 Drake Law Review note, Glenn Goodwin developed a
"sovereignty" argument. 7 against taxing religious organizations.' His argument
is part theology and part jurisprudence, and it is often difficult to identify the
principal thrust of his argument. From his discussion, however, one can discern

113. Witte, supra note 34, at 364 (footnotes omitted).
114. Walz, 397 U.S. 664.
115. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989).
116. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (holding that
state sales tax as applied to religious materials did not violate the First Amendment).
117. Evelyn Brody suggests sovereignty as a way to explain the current tax exemption regime for
charities, but she ultimately rejects sovereignty as a policy rationale for tax exemption. Evelyn Brody, Of
Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizingthe CharityTax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 587 (1998).
118. Goodwin, supra note 25.
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several possible arguments supporting the assertion that American governments
cannot exercise sovereignty over churches.' 9
First, Goodwin starts with the correct premise that taxation is a sovereign act:
to tax is to be a sovereign."O A corollary of that premise is that the taxing power
does not extend to objects over which the government is not sovereign. For
instance, a state cannot tax an instrumentality of the Federal Government,' 2 ' the
District of Columbia cannot tax foreign embassies, 122 and New York does not tax
the United Nations.123 From this, Goodwin concludes not that the church is akin
to a foreign nation but that "if a state seeks to impose property taxation on the
property of a church, it follows that the state is claiming sovereignty over the
church as an institution."' 24 Goodwin then departs the law in favor of theology,
pointing to Jesus Christ's direction to "'[riender unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's."' 25 Although Goodwin
admits that the Christian faith raises no objection to taxes laid on individuals, he
26
believes that churches as organizations are rendered only to God, not Caesar.
Accordingly, Goodwin concludes that churches are not subject to Caesar's
power, only to God's power. By this reasoning, Goodwin concludes that
churches are not subject to the government's taxing power.22 Goodwin declares
that any attempt to tax the church would be unconstitutional because the state's
"claim of sovereignty over the church has been rejected by Christianity for the
28
last two-thousand years."'
Goodwin is obviously mistaken if he believes the Christian doctrine does not
rise to the level of constitutional principle. It simply is not true that what is
contrary to longstanding Christian principle is ipso facto contrary to the U.S.
Constitution. Goodwin's conclusion may be firmly grounded in Christian faith
and doctrine; there is no reason to doubt that at least some Christians would
object honestly and vigorously if the government taxed their church's property or
income. However, religious doctrine is not constitutional doctrine. For instance,
the Catholic Church's objection to the death penalty' 29 has never been considered

119. Goodwin's analysis seems confined to Christianity. He does not consider the doctrine of other
major (or minor) religions in his argument. Therefore, this discussion assumes that his analysis with respect to
Christianity is applicable across religions. This assumption, needless to mention, is doubtful.
120. Id. at 390.
121. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
122. D.C. CODE§ 47-1002(3) (2001).
123. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 416 (McKinney 2001).
124. Goodwin, supra note 25, at 392.
125. Id. at 390 (quoting Matthew 22:21).
126. Id. at 390-91.
127. Id. at 393 ('"The church.., is supportive of, but not subject to, Caesar's role in the exercise of just
government ....But the payment of direct taxes on churches is [a] symbolic act of subjection the church dare
not render to the state ....
' (quoting R. NEUHAUS, CHRISTIAN FAITH & PUBLIC POLICY 173 (1977)).
128. Id. at 392.
129. See John Bookser Feister, The Pope Visits Saint Louis, ST. ANTHONY MESSENGER, Apr. 1999,
http://www.americancatholic.orglMessenger/Aprl999/featurel.asp#F6 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
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a reason to hold the practice unconstitutional. Undoubtedly, it would be a
fortunate coincidence for Catholics if constitutional principles were consistent
with their religious tenets. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not require such
congruence. The Constitution, not religious doctrine, must provide the source and
content of any legal right to be free from taxation.' 3OGoodwin's argument fails
because it gives theological reasons for constitutional holdings, not constitutional
reasons for constitutional holdings.
This being said, Goodwin may be arguing that there is a sincerely held religious
belief in certain Christian sects that paying income or property tax violates their duty
to God. That is likely true in many cases.' If this is Goodwin's claim, then it is not
relevant to the constitutional question of whether the government is sovereign over
the church for purposes of taxation. It is, however, relevant to a claim that a
particular tax violates the Free Exercise Clause. These types of arguments are
considered in Section C below.
Lastly, Goodwin points to Justice Marshall's famous dictum that "the power to
tax involves the power to destroy."'' 32 From this, Goodwin concludes that "a tax on
the church is tantamount to a claim by the government that it has the latent power to
destroy the church."' 133 Assuming that this conclusion is correct, the only constitutional reason to deny the government the authority to destroy the church is the Free
Exercise Clause. This, again, is not a claim that the concept of sovereignty does not
comprehend taxing churches. Rather, it is a claim that because the Free Exercise
Clause forbids the government from destroying the church, it also denies the
government the power to tax the church.
In the end, Goodwin is unable to provide convincing legal or theoretical support
for his assertion that the government is not sovereign over the church. His arguments
fail as irrelevant or confused: he either makes a theological argument or a Free
Exercise argument. Of course, the sovereignty argument he makes may be of some
theological or philosophical interest. 1 4 But as a legal argument that one could take to
a court, Goodwin cannot show that taxing churches is in any way inconsistent with
the constitutional concept of sovereignty.

("'I renew the appeal I made most recently at Christmas for a consensus to end the death penalty, which is both
cruel and unnecessary,' [Pope John Paul I] said. 'Modem society has the means of protecting itself, without
definitively denying criminals the chance to reform."'). See generally Am. Catholic, The Death Penalty and the
Catholic Church, http://www.americancatholic.org/News/DeathPenalty/default.asp (last visited Aug. 11, 2007)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
130. This point may be translated into quasi-Hartian sociological terms. Judges and public officials in
America accept the U.S. Constitution as the rule of recognition. This is a social fact capable of observation and
disproof. The Bible (or Christian doctrine inspired by the Bible) is neither accepted as a rule of recognition nor
a body of law legitimated by the U.S. Constitution. Thus, the Bible is not "law" in the Hartian sense and cannot
bind judges and public officials.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (involving an Amish farmer who claimed that
paying Social Security taxes was contrary to his religion).
132. Goodwin, supra note 25, at 392; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
133. Id.
134. Thomas, supra note 25, at 610-11.
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C. Free Exercise Clause
35
Although commentators dismiss Free Exercise arguments against taxation,
Justice Burger remarked in Walz v. Tax Commission that tax exemption "has
operated affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious
belief."' 36 A possible implication of Burger's remark, which Goodwin
defended, 3 7 is that the imposition of a tax might impermissibly burden the free
exercise of religious belief. Although Walz left open the question of whether the
Free Exercise clause mandated tax exemption, subsequent cases have likely
foreclosed any plausible argument that tax exemption is constitutionally
necessary.
Before addressing the doctrinal question, it might be appropriate to analyze
what can be called Goodwin's "argument from Marshall."'38 Goodwin's argument was as follows:
1 39
(a) The power to tax implies the power to destroy;
(b) If the government can tax religious organizations, then the government can destroy religious organizations;
(c) The government cannot destroy religious organizations;
(d) Therefore, the government cannot tax religious organizations.'4 °

The logic of the argument is sound, but the conclusion is not true because the
first premise, which rests on a fatal misreading of Justice Marshall's opinion, is
false. Marshall's worry in M'Culloch v. Maryland was not the power to tax per
se but rather the power to tax without discernable limit. Marshall could see no
logical boundary to Maryland's claimed power to tax the federal bank.'4' Thus, in
the opinion's key discussion, Marshall wrote that the "unlimited power to tax
involves ... a power to destroy.' 42 The Supreme Court has since declared that
"the Establishment Clause... specifically limit[s] the taxing and spending power
conferred by Art. I, § 8.' ' 3 Therefore, because the power to tax religion is not
unlimited, Marshall's aphorism is inapplicable.
Furthermore, precedent contradicts the premise on which the "argument from
Marshall" relies. Movie studios and record labels are engaged in speech, and

135. Stephen Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Render Unto
Caesar?,29 U. FLA. L. REV. 50, 54-55 (1976).
136. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,678 (1970).
137. Goodwin, supra note 25, at 397-401.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
139. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
140. In symbolic logic: A * B. -B, therefore -A. This is a form of valid inference known as denying the
consequent.
141. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 326-28.
142. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
143. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105 (1968).
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newspapers and news stations are members of the press. Like free exercise,
freedoms of both speech and the press are protected by the First Amendment.'"
However, as a matter of constitutional principle, the Court has unequivocally
rejected the contention that government may not tax the press.' 45 Clearly, the
government can tax the media-and by analogy religious organizations-even
though it lacks the power to destroy them.
Turning now to the Court's Free Exercise doctrine, it quickly becomes clear
that the Constitution poses no barrier to taxing religious organizations. John E.
Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, summarizing the law in this area, flatly declared
that "[tihe Supreme Court has never ruled that the free exercise clause requires
the government to grant any person or organization an exemption from a
generally applicable, religiously neutral tax that was not a prior restraint on
religious activity.' 46 A brief review of the cases discloses ample support for that
declaration.
The Court's reasoning in Employment Division v. Smith lays the foundation:
It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for
example, as "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" by those citizens
who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to
regard the same tax as "abridging the freedom.., of the press" of those
publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in
business .... [I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the
activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and147otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended.

Before Smith, any law-even generally applicable, religiously neutral lawsthat burdened a sincere religious belief would be upheld only if necessary to
promote a compelling government interest.14 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority in Smith, rejected this balancing test in favor of a bright-line rule.'4 9

144. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press...."). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16 (2000)
(offering treatise coverage of freedom of speech).
145. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) ("We have said repeatedly that a State
may impose on the press a generally applicable tax.").
146. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 144, § 17.8, at 1226-27.
147. 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
148. E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1981). See also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause required that Amish families be exempt from a law forcing
all children to attend formal high school to age sixteen).
149. 494 U.S. at 885; see also id. at 890 ("[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice
exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the
appropriate occasions forits creation can be discemed by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system
in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against
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Thus, after Smith, it appears that any generally applicable and religiously neutral
law, including a tax, will be upheld even if it burdens a sincerely held religious
belief.
Three qualifications seem necessary. First, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the
Court invalidated a statute that required persons canvassing or soliciting within
the city to pay a tax.'5 ° The Court in that case reasoned that such a tax operated as
a prior restraint on protected religious activity. Murdock is still good law, even
though it has been limited by subsequent cases. ' Therefore, a tax that operates as
a prior restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs will be struck down even
if it is generally applicable and religiously neutral.
Second, in Smith, the Court reasoned that a law banning peyote was aimed at
combating "socially harmful conduct.' 5 2 This principal aim was furthered by a
law of general applicability, which had the "incidental effect" of criminalizing a
citizen's religious practice.'53 It would be an entirely different matter if the
primary purpose of a law were to impose an impediment to a citizen's religious
practices. Such a law would be held unconstitutional. This conclusion finds
support in cases where the Court considered taxes on the press. In Grosjean v.
American Press Company, the Court struck down a law "in the guise of a tax"
that was actually intended to limit the dissemination of information. 1 4 These
"censorial goals" are improper.'55 However, even without improper motives, a tax
is invalid if the effect is to discriminate against a certain class of publishers,'56 the
likely reasoning being that such an effect is good evidence of a discriminatory
intent. In sum, a generally applicable, religiously neutral tax will be upheld if the
burden on religious beliefs is an "incidental effect" of a regulation aimed at other
legitimate public purposes,' 7 but the tax will be struck down if its purpose or
primary effect is to burden religious beliefs or practices.
Third, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization upheld a
generally applicable, religiously neutral sales tax against a Free Exercise
challenge.5 Perhaps importantly, the tax at issue was imposed at relatively low
rates.- 9 The Court speculated that "a more onerous tax rate, even if generally
' 6
applicable, might effectively choke off an adherent's religious practices. 0
However, it is uncertain whether the tax rate would be a concern for the Court

the centrality of all religious beliefs.").
150. 319U.S. 105 (1943).
151. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389 (1990).
152. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
153. Id. at 878.
154. 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936).
155. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 580 (1983).
156. Id.
157. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
158. 493 U.S. 378, 389 (1990).
159. Id. (noting that tax "represents only a small fraction of any retail sale").
160. Id. at 392 (citation omitted).
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after Smith-nothing "chokes off' religious practices more than a criminal
prohibition. It is unlikely that a tax, even at high rates, would impinge on
practices any more than a criminal law. Assuming the tax rate remains a concern,
the Court has offered no guidance regarding how high a tax rate is
constitutionally tolerable as applied to religious organizations. One can only
guess that the rate must be relatively
modest and represent only a "small
6
fraction" of income or property value.' '
D. Establishment Clause/ExcessiveEntanglement
The Establishment Clause exists to prevent the government from officially
preferring one religion or denomination over another. 62 It may seem odd to
invoke the Establishment Clause against efforts to remove the tax subsidy of
religious organizations. 163 Nevertheless, it is possible to find some support in the
third prong of a three part test the Supreme Court has used to analyze
Establishment Clause cases.'64
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court held that legislative acts involving religion
must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster an "'excessive government
entanglement' with religion.' 65 The first two are not a concern with respect to a
generally applicable tax, which by its nature has "a secular purpose and neither
advances nor inhibits religion. ' 6 However, some have argued that a tax on
religious organizations would violate Lemon's third prong,
which prohibits
67
excessive entanglement between government and religion.'
It should be noted that the Court in Agostini v. Felton'68 put a new gloss on
the Lemon test. Although it could be thought that it discarded the Lemon test,
Agostini is better regarded as a "repackaging" of the Lemon test.' 69 Accordingly,
courts continue to apply the Lemon test-including the excessive entanglement
prong-taking Agostini into account.' 70 Under Agostini, the entanglement

161. Id. at 389.
162. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
163. Thomas, supra note 25, at 627.
164. The tests used by the Court in the Establishment Clause context were usefully taxonomized by the
Third Circuit in Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2004). The "coercion" test has
been used in the context of school-sponsored religious activity. Id. at 401. The "endorsement" test has been
applied to religious displays on government property. Id. Because neither test would appear to imperil a tax on
religious organizations, this article focuses on the Lemon test.
165. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
166. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990) ("[T]he very
essence of such a tax is that it is neutral and nondiscriminatory on questions of religious belief.").
167. See id. (religious organization argued that state sales and use tax created excessive entanglement);
Goodwin, supra note 25, at 397.
168. 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).
169. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 144, at § 17.3, at 1313.
170. See, e.g., Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d I (2d Cir. 2006); Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake
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question is considered only a part of the inquiry into a statute's effect (i.e., the
second prong of the Lemon test), but it is still considered."'
The Court has acknowledged, as it must, that some entanglement between
church and state is inevitable.12 In fact, the Court generally tolerates a fairly high
degree of contact between church and state. For example, "routine regulatory
interaction" presents no entanglement of constitutional significance: 7 1 churches
must obey building and zoning regulations and submit to inspections in
connection with such regulations. 7 4 The Court in Swaggart tolerated extensive
governmental intrusion, including inspections and examination of church
records.'7 Even requiring churches to disclose basic information about their costs
is not the kind of surveillance the Establishment Clause forbids. 76 Only a
legislative scheme involving a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
state surveillance" will be found to be an excessive entanglement. 77 It is a
demanding test, to be sure. The rest of Part III will unpack the various factual and
legal arguments a religious organization could make in support of the claim that
the entanglement occasioned by taxes is unconstitutionally excessive.
The strongest position would be that any tax imposed on a religious
organization is unconstitutional per se. Of course, any tax would result in some
entanglement, which the Court noted in Walz v. Commissioner: "[g]ranting tax
exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford [them] ...[less] involvement than taxing them.' 7 8 But that doesn't mean that an income or property tax
would per se generate impermissible entanglement. The Walz passage merely
compares exemption with taxation and observes that the former involves less
entanglement than the latter.' 79 So, one cannot conclude from Walz that the level
of entanglement occasioned by taxation would necessarily be unconstitutionally
excessive. On the contrary, the Court has upheld certain taxes as applied to

City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1258-61 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Lemon... remains the starting point for our
Establishment Clause analysis' (quoting Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 1009 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation
omitted))); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson County, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he
Establishment Clause issue ... is properly analyzed... under the Lemon test."); Modrovich v. Allegheny
County, 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2004) (identifying and applying three tests the Court has articulated to govern
Establishment Clause cases, the Lemon test included).
171. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
172. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
173. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989) (citing Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969)).
174. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985).
175. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 389 (1990).
176. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 698.
177. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
178. 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
179. See also id. at 676 ("The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between
church and state and far less than taxation of churches.").
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religious organizations. " Therefore, a tax on religious organizations is not
constitutionally suspect in principle.
However, that is not to say that all taxes are constitutionally permissible. The
Court consistently strikes down legislation that requires the government to
inquire into the religious nature of an activity or product. Lemon held that
governmental aid to religious schools is unconstitutional if the aid is conditioned
on the school's maintaining a certain percentage of secular expenditures. 8 , This
condition, the Court believed, would require the government to audit school
records to ascertain which expenditures were secular and which were religious.'82
Similarly, a sales tax exemption granted by the State of Texas only to religious
publications violated the Establishment Clause because determining whether the
exemption applied necessitated an inquiry into the religious nature of the item
sold. "83
' On the other hand, a facially neutral, broadly applicable sales tax has been
upheld as applied to a religious organization because such a law required no
inquiry into religious or nonreligious content. 84 Thus, one may conclude that a
religiously neutral tax is constitutionally permissible' 5 but any inquiry into
86 the
religious or nonreligious content or use would raise entanglement red flags.'
One can also safely conclude that a tax that levied different rates on, for
example, churches and mosques, would be unconstitutional because (1) such a
law is facially discriminatory, and (2) such a law would necessitate an inquiry
into the existence and nature of substantive religious belief. The same flaw would
exist in a tax whose rates differed for religious corporations and secular
corporations. But a tax that made no distinction between denominations or
between religious and secular corporations would not have such faults. For
instance, extending the federal corporate tax to all corporations, nonprofit and
for-profit alike, may be sufficiently neutral to pass muster under the
Establishment Clause. The only question in such a case-is the taxpayer a
corporation?--could be answered by looking only at the Articles of Incorporation; no inquiry in religious beliefs would be involved. Similarly, a five percent
flat income tax levied on the income of all nonprofit entities would not require an
inquiry into religious belief; any corporation observing the "nondistribution

180. E.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries,493 U.S. at 396.
181. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
182. Id.at 620.
183. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989).
184. Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 396.
185. Cf id. (noting that the tax at issue "[mlost significantly" did not require inquiry into religious
content or motivation).
186. Tilton v. Richardson is not to the contrary. In Tilton, the Court upheld a program that provided
block grants to institutions of higher education for construction of academic facilities, provided that the
facilities were not used for religious worship or education. 403 U.S. 672, 675 (1971). Unlike the program in
Lemon, the "one-time, single-purpose" grant involved in Tilton required "no government analysis of an
institution's expenditures on secular as distinguished from religious activities." Id. at 688.
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constraint ' would be eligible for the preferential rate. Thus, entanglement can
be avoided simply by making religion irrelevant and making taxable status turn
solely on the corporate form.'88
One final point that is relatively clear: a property tax seems safe from an
Establishment Clause challenge. In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization,the Court held that a facially neutral sales and use tax did not create
excessive entanglement despite a church's allegation that there were "on-site
inspections ... , lengthy on-site audits, examinations of [the church's] books and
records, threats of criminal prosecution, and layers of administrative and judicial
proceedings."'' 9 Although the Court doubted that the burden was as severe as the
church alleged,' 9° it concluded that the tax would have been constitutional even if
the church's allegations were true.' 9' These sorts of contacts between government

and religion, the Court declared, did "not rise to a constitutionally significant
level."' 92 Although Swaggart considered only sales and use taxes, the holding
seems readily applicable to any property tax. After all, the entanglement
potentially involved in a sales tax-audits of inventory, cost, and profit-is
surely more than that involved in a property tax, which is limited to valuation and
assessment of real estate.
It is a closer question with respect to an income tax. ' 93 An income tax would

187. A term coined by Henry Hansmann to describe firms that do not distribute net earnings. See Henry
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 837, 840 (1980).
188. This scheme would also avoid one problem the Court has seen in some Establishment Clause cases:
the sectarian division in society. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971); but see Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n. 11 (1983) (limiting the "divisive political potential" inquiry to cases in which direct
financial aid was given to parochial schools). If all corporations, or all nonprofits, are subject to the same tax
rates, the economic interests would not break down on sectarian lines.
189. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 392.
190. Id. at 394 ("[Tihe evidence of administrative entanglement... is thin.").
191. Id. at 394-95.
192. Id. at 394.
193. Some have claimed that the concept of income is inapplicable to nonprofit enterprises, presumably
including religious organizations. See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizationsfrom FederalIncome Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). Others assert that most churches would
produce no income because they derive most of their revenue from gifts, which have long been excluded from
income under section 102(a) of the Code. See L. BUZZARD & S. ERICSSON, THE BATTLE FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 268 (1982).

The former claim seems considerably less persuasive than the latter; Bittker and Rahdert certainly
overstate the difficulties associated with developing a workable concept of income in this context. See
COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 28, at 22-27. On the other hand, it probably is true that religious organizations
would have little, if any, income tax liability if gifts were exempted. In fact, religious institutions received over
$93 billion in donations in 2005, representing 35.8% of total charitable gifts in that year, all of which would
have been excluded from their income if they were tax-paying entities. Association of Fundraising
Professionals, Annual U.S. Charitable Giving Exceeds $260 Billion, June 19, 2006, http://afpnet.org/ka/ka3.cfm?folder id=2545&content item id=23672 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). However, three
replies seem apt.
First, transfers to religious organizations are not necessarily excludible gifts. It is possible to view
transfers to religious institutions not as gifts reflecting donative intent, but rather as membership fees, service
charges, or payments in quantum meruit. The Church of Scientology, for example, has long charged its
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create fairly extensive entanglements, certainly more extensive than sales or
property tax. Under any income tax regime, religious organizations would be
forced to track income and expenses and file tax returns reporting and
substantiating the amounts claimed. In this connection, religious organizations
would have to bear the administrative burdens associated with accounting and
navigating regulatory procedure. There would also be periodic payments to the
government, or refunds for overpayment, which would create a "continuing
financial relationship.' 94 Finally, in order to verify income and deductions
claimed, the IRS would need continuing power to monitor and audit religious
organizations (e.g. examining receipts, donor lists, expense ledgers, etc.). In
short, the entire financial life of religious organizations would be open to
governmental scrutiny, inevitably giving rise to "comprehensive, discriminating,
and continuing state surveillance."' 9
Of course, religious organizations are already subject to continuing
governmental surveillance under laws that are clearly constitutional as applied to
them, such as zoning laws, securities laws, wage and payroll tax laws. The
questions then become: (1) would an income tax generate entanglements
different than those generated by current law (which are assumed to be
constitutional)? (2) would an income tax generate increased entanglement
relative to current law? and (3) are such new or increased entanglements
sufficient to render an income tax unconstitutional? The answer to the first
question is no; the second and third questions, I contend, should be answered in
the affirmative.
1. Would an Income Tax Generate EntanglementsDifferent Than Those
Generatedby CurrentLaw?
Under existing law, there are extensive connections between religious
institutions and the federal taxing authority. To begin with, all religious
organizations (except churches) must file an application asking the IRS to
recognize their tax-exempt status. 196 Once recognized as tax-exempt, religious

adherents fees for "auditing" and "training." See CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A CONTEMPORARY RELIGION

INTERNATIONAL, SCIENTOLOGY:

33-37 (1998). The Supreme Court held that these

payments were not donations because they represented a quid pro quo transaction. See Hernandez v. Comm'r,
490 U.S. 680 (1989). Although the IRS later reversed its policy disallowing such deductions, the Court's
reasoning in Hernandez is still good law.
Second, it is possible that Congress could change this rule, at least with respect to nonprofits-there is
nothing conceptually difficult about including gifts in gross income. Excluding gifts from income is inconsistent
with the Haig-Simons concept of income, which is a widely accepted concept. See David G. Duff, Rethinking
the Concept of Income in Tax Law and Policy 2-4 (Feb. 2006), http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/index.asp?page=
2327 (unpublished article, cited with permission). If gifts were included in gross income, it might be the case
that religious organizations would have taxable income after otherwise allowable expenses and deductions.
194. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
195. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
196. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 3,
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organizations (including churches) must retain books and records to justify their
claim for exemption in the event of an audit.' 97 But even if an organization has
operated for religious purposes prima facie, its tax exemption is subject to
several limitations.' 8 For one, any organization whose net earnings "inure" to the
benefit of insiders risks losing its tax exemption. '" Indeed, the IRS has
successfully revoked the exemption of churches that paid insiders grossly
excessive compensation and benefits, 2°° and the taxpayers in those cases did not
allege that the IRS's inquiry created a danger of excessive entanglement.
Furthermore, no tax-exempt religious organization may devote a substantial part
20 2
20
of its activities to influencing legislation ' or intervene in a political campaign.
Simply qualifying for and maintaining exempt status involves more than trivial
entanglement, but that is just the beginning.
Religious organizations (except churches) 203 must file an informational return
known as a Form 990 on an annual basis. 2° The Form 990 requires disclosure of,
among other things, income, expenses, disbursements, assets, liabilities, net
worth, information regarding compensation, names and addresses of officers and
directors, and lobbying expenditures. 205 In regards to mandatory disclosure, Form
990 is as detailed and intrusive as Form 1120 (the income tax return form for
U.S. corporations).
Moreover, like other employers, all religious organizations are required to
withhold income taxes for their employees and report such withholding on a
quarterly basis.2 6 In addition, religious organizations must withhold and pay
FICA taxes (i.e., Social Security and Medicare) for their paid employees.2 0 ' The
Court specifically held that the reporting obligations imposed by the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which include keeping employment records and disclosing them
to the government, do not give rise to an excessive entanglement. 208

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p 828.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
197. I.R.S. Announcement 94-111, 1994-37 I.R.B. 36.
198. Apart from the limitations discussed in the text, exempt religious organizations cannot serve a
private interest, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)- (d)(l)(ii), and are prohibited from lobbying and endorsing political
candidates. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2006).
199. Treas. Reg. § 1.50 1(c)(3)-I(c)(2) (as amended in 1990).
200. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm'r, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987); Bubbling Well of
Universal Love, Inc. v. Comm'r, 670 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1981); Unitary Mission Church of Long Island v.
Comm'r, 74 T.C. 507 (1980).
201. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (h).
202. Id.
203. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i).
204. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1).
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1995).
206. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 196, at 14.
207. Id. Churches that are opposed on religious grounds to the payment of FICA taxes may elect to be
exempt from the FICA tax system by filing Form 8274.
208. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985).
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But perhaps a more significant entanglement is the Unrelated Business
Income Tax (UBIT).209 Generally, all exempt organizations must pay tax on
income from regular business activity that is not substantially related to its
exempt purpose.' 0 Although originally exempt from the UBIT,2 ' churches are
now subject to the UBIT. To comply with this tax, churches and other religious
organizations must report their income on a Form 990-T if gross income from the
conduct of an unrelated business exceeds $1,000.212 For example, a church that

makes a modest net profit from selling advertisements in its Sunday service
program would have to report and pay tax on this income. Churches must also
retain records adequate to substantiate their claimed income and deductions.2 3
Therefore, the nature of the entanglement created by compliance with current
law is the same as would be occasioned by a full-scale income tax: recordkeeping, annual returns, some tax payment liability, and the possibility of audits.
Thus, the difference between current law and a full-scale income tax would be
one of degree, not of kind.
2.

Would an Income Tax Generate IncreasedEntanglement Relative to
CurrentLaw?

The extent to which a full-scale tax would increase the entanglement between
religion and government depends on the organization in question. The entanglement
would not increase much for non-church religious publishing houses: they already
file annual returns, are subject to audit, and must file and pay the UBIT. The most
important new entanglement for these organizations would be the check they would
have to write payable to the U.S. Treasury each year-a modest new entanglement.2 4
For churches, on the other hand, the increased entanglement would be
substantial. Although churches are now subject to limited audits and must account
for and pay the UBIT, they need not apply for exemption or file annual returns. If
subject to an income tax, churches would have to disclose a vast amount of financial
information to the government; information that currently may be kept private.
In sum, a full-scale income tax would not generate entanglements that are
different in kind from those generated by current law. Nevertheless, a full-scale
income tax would exacerbate and expand the entanglements generated by current
law. Thus, assuming that current law creates no excessive entanglement, the question
then becomes whether the new entanglements would pass constitutional muster.
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3. Are Such New or IncreasedEntanglements Sufficient to Render an
Income Tax Unconstitutional?
One might conclude that because an income tax would subject religious
organizations to exactly the same regulatory regime to which ordinary taxable
entities are already subject, the entanglements caused by an income tax should
not be considered excessive. After all, religious organizations would bear a
burden no different than any taxable organization. The obvious problem with this
line of argument is that it assumes that there are no relevant differences between
religious organizations and other organizations. But religious organizations are
different from ordinary organizations by virtue of their favored constitutional
status. That is, government may become as entangled as it wishes with respect to
commercial corporations, but government must keep some distance from
religion. 2t5 Therefore, comparing the relative burdens of religious and nonreligious organizations under an income tax is not a tenable strategy in this
context. Rather, one must examine and evaluate the entanglements in
themselves.2

6

Let us consider an income tax as applied to those which an income tax would
present the greatest increase in entanglement: churches.2 7 We shall leave aside
nonchurch religious organizations for two reasons. First, the arguments relevant
to nonchurch religious organizations are basically the same as those relevant to
churches. Second, it is not always clear whether such organizations are entitled to
constitutional protection as religious organizations. Consider a corporation that
sustains itself by publishing and selling books promoting the Christian faith. Is
that corporation religious or commercial in nature for constitutional purposes?
The answer could plausibly be both. On the other hand, it is hardly arguable that
the Episcopalian Diocese of Indiana, for example, is not a religious organization.
Therefore, the following discussion is limited to churches for the simple reason
that doing so allows us to fully examine the primary issue without being
unnecessarily distracted by the classification problem.
Recall that churches currently do not have to apply for tax exemption and are
exempt from filing annual informational returns. Essentially, apart from FICA
and income-tax withholding for employees, a church could have no contact with
the IRS. Under an income tax, all that would change for churches-they would
have to file annual returns, make periodic tax payments, and be subject to audit.
One might think that Hernandez removes the worry of excessive
entanglement in requiring a church to itemize and report its expenses and
income. 218 However, in that case, the Court warned in a footnote that it did "not

215. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
216. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).
217. I note again that I use the term "church" in a broad technical sense, as used by the Code and the
IRS. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
218. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 698 (1989) (holding that forced disclosure of costs is not

759

2007/Taxing God
rule out the possibility that, under the circumstances of a particular case, an IRS
inquiry ... into a religious institution's expenses might raise entanglement
problems."2 9 When making this warning, the Court may have had in mind the
sorts of inquiries into expenses that would prove inevitable under an income tax.
If so, it is not difficult to understand the Court's concern. In order to enforce an
income tax, the government must have the power to force disclosure of all
aspects of a church's financial life. In order to substantiate income, the
government would need extensive information regarding both the identity of
contributors and the amount of contributions to the church. In addition, every
transaction in land and intangible property would be disclosed in order to
substantiate capital gain and loss. All of the expenses of the church would need
to be disclosed as well-for it is only natural to assume that the "ordinary and
necessary expenses" in carrying on the church's purpose would be
deductible 22 -- including the salaries of clergy and staff, mission expenses, travel
and operating expenses, and so on. This state of affairs would represent an
unprecedented expansion in the scope of government-religion entanglement. An
income tax would open up the finances of every church in America to continuing
and comprehensive governmental scrutiny. It would, in the event of an audit or a
church's noncompliance, subject every church to the power of the government to
search and seize records and correspondence, compel testimony, confiscate
records, and criminally prosecute. This state of affairs is, in my judgment,
constitutionally intolerable.
It will not do to respond that churches already have some obligation to
disclose financial information, pay taxes, and endure audits. As I have said, a
full-scale income tax would entail not different kinds of entanglements but vastly
expanded entanglements of the same kind that now exist. The obligations to
disclose and pay are now limited and often pertain to an isolated transaction, a
series of transactions, or a segregated portion of operations. An income tax, in
contrast, would reach every transaction on a continuing basis. Therefore, an
income tax would be unconstitutional not because it would generate new
entanglement but because it would generate increased and excessive
entanglement.
Moreover, because the IRS exercises some discretion in choosing audit
subjects, there is the possibility of discriminatory enforcement. The danger of
discriminatory enforcement is very real: unfettered discretion to audit religious
organizations would be a frightening possibility to many-particularly to
marginal and traditionally persecuted sects. As Justice Murphy recognized over
sixty years ago, "the taxing.., power is a dangerous and potent weapon which,

necessarily violative of the Establishment Clause).
219. Id.atn.12.
220. Cf I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2006).
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in the hands of unscrupulous or bigoted men, could be used to suppress freedoms
and destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds."22'
Of course, all laws-including those that are constitutional as applied to
churches like zoning laws-are susceptible to being enforced in invidious ways.
An income tax would be no different than any generally applicable law in this
respect. Moreover, there may be constitutional remedies for any religious
organization unfairly targeted by law enforcement (i.e., an organization could
argue that its Due Process or Equal Protection rights were violated by a program
of selective enforcement).222 It is also possible that curative judicial doctrines
could be developed to force the government to disgorge any benefit it derives
from such discriminatory prosecution. There could also be statutory constraints
on discretion in selecting audit targets like those already in the Code.223 Under
section 7611, an audit of a church can commence only if a high-level Treasury
official has a reasonable belief that tax may be due224 and the Secretary provides
written notice of the inquiry to the church.225 Section 7611 also limits the scope of
IRS inquiries: only relevant records can be examined 2 6 and the inquiries
generally must be completed within two years. 2" The requirement of probable
cause and the scope limitation would, in theory, cause the incidence of
discriminatory audits to decline, by making it more difficult for the IRS to act
capriciously.
Such exogenous limits on audit discretion-other constitutional provisions,
curative judicial doctrines, and statutory procedural restraints-would ameliorate
the potential entanglement 228 but would not completely remove it. In the final
analysis, the IRS would still have the power to pry open the financial workings of
religious organizations. It is difficult to imagine what would be more entangling
than continuous and systematic governmental surveillance of church finances
coupled with the power to audit. If those sorts of entanglements were
constitutionally acceptable, it is hard to see how any regulatory scheme could be
unconstitutional for excessive entanglement.

221. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573,579 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
222. E.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1974) ("[A]ny 'systematic
discrimination' in enforcement or 'unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances,'
violates the equal protection clause .... " (quoting United States v. Robinson, 311 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (W.D.
Mo. 1969); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (citations omitted)); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,
211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
223. See I.R.C. § 7611.
224. I.R.C. § 7611(a)(2).
225. I.R.C. § 7611(a)(3).
226. I.R.C. § 7611 (b)(1)(A) (records may only be examined "to the extent necessary to determine the
liability for, and the amount of, any tax").
227. I.R.C. § 7611(c)(1)(A).
228. Of course, it could be argued that these procedural safeguards impermissibly single out religious
organizations for more favorable audit treatment than other taxpayers. Cf Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that exemption solely for religious organizations violated the Establishment Clause). It is
this sort of Catch-22 that the Court has lamented in the Religion Clause context.
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I have no doubt that many will find this conclusion surprising, if not
intuitively unacceptable. However, I suggest that their complaint should be with
the Lemon test, not with this article's analysis. The Lemon test provides that a
law whose effect fosters an excessive governmental entanglement with religion
violates the Establishment Clause. 229 This article, being a descriptive project,
accepts (without defending) the Lemon test. As far as I can conceive, there is no
regime more intrusive and entangling than a full-scale income tax. Accordingly,
it does not seem possible for the Lemon test to remain law and a full-scale
income tax to be permissible under it. Perhaps the Lemon test is ill-conceived;
perhaps the best understanding of the Constitution permits a tax on churches.
That view is perfectly consistent with this article's conclusion, which is that
current Supreme Court doctrine, i.e., the Lemon doctrine, does not permit a fullscale income tax on churches.
IV. EIGHT CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE TAXING POWER

One can draw two broad conclusions from the analysis in Part III. First, the
U.S. Constitution does not categorically prevent the government from taxing
religious organizations. Second, and more importantly, the U.S. Constitution
limits the government's power to tax religious organizations. However, these two
conclusions are too vague to be useful in the absence of some refinement. This
Part distills the body of cases analyzed in Part III into eight different ways in
which the Constitution constrains the government's ability to tax religious
organizations. If a taxing regime complies with these eight requirements, it will
be constitutionally permissible.
A. A Tax Must Not Have the Purposeor PrimaryEffect of Promotingor
Inhibiting Religion
This maxim comes from (1) the first prong of the Lemon test-any government regulation must have a secular purpose, 230 (2) Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Company,"' and (3) the guiding principle of the Free Exercise Clause-the
government may not interfere with religious freedom.232 The central point is that
the government must impose a particular tax as a revenue-raising device, not as2 3a3
measure to inhibit the free exercise of religion through "the guise of a tax.
Thus, if a tax has an impermissible intent or primary effect, the tax is inconsistent
with the Constitution and will be struck down.
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B. A Tax Must Be Imposed on Religious Organizationsat the Same Rate as that
Imposed on Other Similarly Situated Organizations
This principle is the implication of Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, in which
the Court held unconstitutional a tax exemption granted only to religious
publications. 23 In that case, the Court indicated that the exemption would have
been constitutional had it been granted to a larger class of charitable
organizations. 23' The same reasoning should apply to the legislature's choice of
tax rates. Specifically, it would be unconstitutional to single out religious
organizations for either higher or lower rates than a broad class of other
organizations, but it would be permissible to give preferential rates to, or impose
higher rates on, a broad category of organizations such as the list of organizations
listed in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code: "religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the prevention of

cruelty to children or animals." The key point is that religious organizations may
not be singled out for either preferential or punitive rates.
C. Religious OrganizationsMust Be Subject to the Same Rules as Other
Organizations
This maxim is similar to the preceding one in that it finds support in Bullock,
but it is slightly different. Where the second principle pertains to tax rates, this
third principle pertains to the nature and contours of the tax regime in question.
To illustrate this principle, consider the treatments of gifts under the Code.
Under current law, gifts are not treated as income to the donee.236 If the Code
allowed all taxpayers to exclude gifts from their income except religious
organizations, such a rule would impermissibly impose special burdens on
religious organizations.237 However, it would be constitutional to exclude gifts
from the income of all individuals but include gifts in the income of all
corporations, or vice versa, because under such a rule religious organizations are
part of a large class of organizations that receive the same treatment. Similarly, in
the context of a property tax, if a state determined property tax liability by
multiplying the assessed value by a specific percentage, the state must apply that
same method to religious organizations (or an adequately broad class of
organizations) as well. The state may not impose a tax on a per-acre basis with
respect to religious organizations and on a per-dollar-value basis with respect to
all other organizations.
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D. No Tax May Operate as a PriorRestrainton Religious Activity
This principle is a restatement of the holding in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
which invalidated a statute that required persons wishing to canvass or solicit
within the city pay a tax before doing so."'
E. The Government May Not Make Excessive Inquiry into the Religious Nature
of a Use or Product
This principle responds to the Court's concern that a regulation necessitating
any inquiry into the religious nature of a use or expenditure risks creating an
excessive entanglement. The Court struck down a grant program that would have
required the government to determine which of a religious school's expenditures
were secular and which were religious.239 In contrast, the Court upheld a "onetime, single-purpose" grant to religious schools that required "no government
analysis of an institution's expenditures on secular as distinguished from
religious activities. 24 ° Similarly, the Court struck down a sales tax exemption
granted only to religious publications because determining whether the
exemption applied necessitated an inquiry into the religious nature of the
publication.24 However, a facially neutral, broadly applicable sales tax was
upheld as applied to religious publications because the tax itself required no
inquiry into religious or nonreligious content.4 2
Therefore, nothing of importance can turn on the religious nature of a use or
expenditure. For example, if the government taxes an organization's property at
all, it must tax all the organization's property. With respect to the same
organizations, the government may not exempt property used for religious
purposes and tax the property used for other purposes.243 Similarly, there may be

no deduction that distinguishes between "religious" expenses like minister's
salaries and "secular" expenditures like utility bills.
238. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
239. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
240. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
241. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989).
242. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 396 (1990) (noting that the tax at
issue "most significantly" did not require inquiry into religious content or motivation).
243. This, in my view, is one point at which the Court's construction of the Constitution may depart
from the best reading of the Constitution. It cannot be the case that the Constitution truly disallows inquiry into
the religious nature. After all, in order to determine which organizations are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, or when a government action is tantamount to the establishment of religion, one must inquire whether
the organization is religious in nature. Of course, if one were an originalist, one might point out that there was a
long-standing practice at the time of the Founding of exempting some church property and taxing other church
property. See supra Part II.B-C. It is doubtful that the Framers, or a reasonable person living in the founding
era, would have understood the Constitution to prohibit that practice.
Of course, the root of the Court's concern may be that it is not proper for certain kinds or classes of public
officials to make such distinctions. In that case, the issue would be about the locus of decisional authority and
not about the inquiry into religious nature per se.
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F. There Should Be Appropriate Statutory Limits on the Discretion to Audit
This principle addresses the possibility that discriminatory enforcement
could create an excessive entanglement. 2 4 Section 7611 of the Code erects two
important procedural safeguards that should diminish the probability of
discrimination: it requires that the tax agency have probable cause to audit and it
limits the length and scope of audits. Under section 7611, an audit can commence
only if a high-level Treasury official has a reasonable belief that a tax may be
due245 and the Secretary provides written notice of the inquiry to the church.246
During the audit, only relevant records can be examined 247 and the inquiries
generally must be completed within two years. 248 It is likely that laws similar to
section 7611 of the Internal Revenue Code would satisfy the discriminatory
enforcement concern.
However, a tax regime that does not have a provision like section 7611
would probably not be unconstitutional for that reason alone. As noted above, all
laws are susceptible to discriminatory enforcement. In this regard, tax law is no
more dangerous than the criminal law. Curative judicial doctrines should be
sufficient to remedy and deter official discrimination. Thus, it is not necessary,
but it is certainly desirable, to have prophylactic audit rules.
G. Any Tax Must Not Be Excessively Onerous
This principle responds to the Court's vague concern in Jimmy Swaggart
' 249
Ministries that a Free Exercise problem could arise if a tax were too "onerous.
Being mere dicta, it may not be a serious constitutional issue. Indeed, it is unclear
how the line should be drawn between acceptable rates of taxation and "onerous"
rates of taxation. Does a tax burden "choke off... religious practices '25 ° at 50%,
30%, or 10%? Thus, this principle provides more theoretical than practical
guidance for legislatures.
H. The Income Tax as CurrentlyAdministered by the Federal Government
Would Be Unconstitutionalas Applied to Religious Organizations
Although there would be no free exercise problem with extending a generally
applicable income tax to religious organizations, the pervasive entanglement that

244. See supra text accompanying notes 218-27.
245. I.R.C. § 761 1(a)(2) (West 2006).
246. I.R.C. § 7611(a)(3).
247. I.R.C. § 7611 (b)(1)(A) (noting that records may only be examined "to the extent necessary to
determine the liability for, and the amount of, any tax").
248. I.R.C. § 7611(c)(1)(A).
249. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990).
250. Id.

2007 /Taxing God

an income tax would entail makes it very doubtful that an income tax would be
constitutional. It does not appear possible for the Supreme Court to insist that
excessive entanglement renders a law unconstitutional while simultaneously
upholding a tax that would create the most extensive of entanglements. If the
Court did sustain an income tax against an Establishment Clause challenge, it
would effectively mean the end of the Lemon/Agostini framework. This article,
however, is premised on current law and, on that basis, concludes that an income
tax would be unconstitutional.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

This Part examines some of the questions raised by the foregoing analysis
and briefly suggests tentative answers.
A.

Would It Be Constitutionalfor the IRS to Revoke a Religious Organization's
501(c)(3) Exemption if It Violated Some Condition of Its Exemption?

The answer is yes. To revoke an organization's section 501(c)(3) status
would not necessarily mean that the organization would be subject to tax. For
example, if an organization's 501(c)(3) status were revoked on grounds of
political activity or intervention in a political campaign, the organization might
still qualify for tax exemption under section 501(c)(4) or section 527. If,
however, the organization's section 501(c)(3) exemption were revoked on
grounds of private inurement, the organization would then likely be subject to tax
prima facie2 5'-meaning that if (contrary to fact) all that existed was the Internal
Revenue Code, then such a religious organization would become taxable.
However, a distinction should be drawn between tax-exemption granted by
statute and tax-exemption granted by the Constitution. As concluded in Part IV, it
would be unconstitutional for the IRS to seek income taxes from a religious
organization, however such an entity might be defined as a constitutional matter.
In light of this, a statutory exemption for religious organizations is largely
superfluous: religious organizations do not need section 501(c)(3)--or any other
provision of the Code-to be exempt from the federal income tax. Rather, the
Constitution confers upon religious organizations the ability to be free from
income taxes like those imposed by the Federal Government. Thus, section
501(c)(3) should be seen like those state statutes that exempt interest on federal
securities: the Constitution precludes a state from taxing the Federal
Government, 2" but most states, nevertheless, explicitly state that interest on
federal securities is exempt from gross income.5 3 Such provisions are largely
251. Section 501(c)(4)(B) precludes exemption for organizations the earnings of which inure "to the
benefit a private shareholder or individual."
252. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
253. E.g., N.Y. Tax Law § 612(c)(1) (2007).
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unnecessary, as is section 501(c)(3) with respect to religious organizations.
Accordingly, Congress may repeal section 501(c)(3) or the IRS may revoke a
religious organization's 501(c)(3) status without running afoul of the
Constitution, so long as the IRS does not seek to recover income taxes from
religious organizations under section 61.254
Of course, there is the possibility that an organization, by virtue of pervasive
political or commercial activity, loses its religious character and its
corresponding First Amendment protection. It is surely true that at some point an
organization may become so deeply engaged in politics, or so dedicated to the
enrichment of insiders, that it loses its distinctly religious character. Although the
analysis in Parts III and IV does not speak to the constitutionality of taxing
political or for-profit organizations, it is safe to assume that a political entity, or
one which provides excessive benefit to insiders, is not entitled to the protection
of the Establishment Clause. In such cases, there would be no constitutional
problem with the IRS treating the organization just like any other taxable entity.
Although a solid conclusion on those types of cases would require a
constitutional definition of religion, a task this article expressly disclaims, it can
be said with some confidence that when religious organizations lose their
religious character, they lose their concomitant constitutional protection, and thus
become liable for tax like any ordinary entity.
B. Are the Limitations on Exempt Status Set Forth in Section 501(c)(3)
Unconstitutionalas Applied to Religious Organizations?
Recall that section 501(c)(3) prohibits excessive lobbying, intervention in
political activity, and private inurement. One might be tempted to think that, to
the extent an organization can engage in these activities and remain a religious
organization as defined in the Constitution, the 501(c)(3) limitations are
unconstitutional. For example, a church would not become a non-religious entity,
and thereby lose its constitutional protection, simply by endorsing a candidate for
President. Therefore, the argument would go, because the Constitution would
forbid the taxation of such an organization, the IRS may not condition the
organization's tax-exempt status on such conditions.
This line of reasoning would overlook the critical distinction between the
statutory exemption and the constitutional exemption. As noted above, not only
are there provisions other than section 501(c)(3) under which a religious
organization may be tax exempt, religious organizations do not even need a
statute to be tax-exempt. Thus, the limitations in section 501(c)(3) are not
conditions on which a religious organization's tax exemption depends. Rather,
the only issue of real importance that turns on 501(c)(3) status as applied to

254. For substantially the same reasons, Congress may at any time repeal section 501(c)(3) and the
entire tax-exemption regime.
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religious organizations is the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds.255 Thus, the
limitations should be seen, in this context, as conditions required for tax-exempt
financing. I have argued that the Constitution requires only that religious
organizations be exempt from the federal income tax (as currently administered),
not that religious organizations be eligible to issue tax-exempt bonds. I seriously
doubt whether the Constitution could possibly require that the interest on such
bonds be exempt from the creditor's gross income. Thus, if any religious
organization ran afoul of the limitations in section 501(c)(3), the Constitution
would preclude the government from taxing such organizations, but the
organization would no longer be able to issue tax-exempt bonds. The net result
would be of no constitutional significance: the religious organization would
remain tax exempt but would not be eligible to finance its operations with taxexempt bonds. Therefore, Congress may limit the benefits of 501(c)(3) as it
currently does.256
C. Could a State ConstitutionallyImpose a Property Tax on Religious
Organizations?
The answer to this question is clearly yes. As noted in Part III, a generally
applicable law will be upheld as applied to religious organizations under the Free
Exercise Clause, and a property tax would entail only as much, and perhaps less,
257
entanglement than a sales tax, which was upheld by the Court in Swaggart.
Therefore, provided that the law otherwise conforms to the eight requirements set
forth in Part IV, a property tax is constitutional.
D. Is the UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax (UBIT) Unconstitutionalas Applied to
Religious Organizations?
For the purposes of comparing the entanglements of current law to those that
would be caused by a full-scale tax, I assumed that the UBIT was not an
258
unconstitutionally excessive entanglement. However, it might be useful to
retrace those steps and examine, in light of the principles articulated in Part IV,
whether the UBIT can withstand scrutiny as applied to religious organizations.
The UBIT was first enacted in 1950259 to prevent exempt organizations from
unfairly exploiting its tax-free status to compete with taxable entities.2 6 Churches

255. See I.R.C. § 145 (West 2006).
256. The case of Branch Ministries.v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000), involved a Free Exercise
challenge to the revocation of section 501(c)(3) status. Thus, the case is inapposite to excessive entanglement
analysis.
257. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. B3d. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
258. See supra Part IV.D.
259. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. 81-814, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 906, 947.
260. H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 36 (1950).
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were exempt from the UBIT for the first twenty years, but for nearly the last forty
years been subject to it just like all other charitable organizations.26 ' The UBIT is
imposed on an exempt organization's gross income derived from the regular
conduct of an unrelated trade or business.262 The Code unhelpfully defines an
unrelated trade or business as one "which is not substantially related ... to the
exercise or performance by such organization of its [exempt] purpose or
function. ... ,,263 To be substantially related, the goods or services involved must
contribute "importantly" to the accomplishment of an exempt purpose.2 6 As the
IRS is wont to do when it cannot think of any better guidance, it makes the
application of the statute depend "in each case upon the facts and circumstances
involved."2' 65
As applied to religious organizations, the need for the IRS to distinguish
religious purposes from other purposes raises constitutional concerns. Consider
what might seem the simplest case: the local church opens up a coffee house. The
religious community itself would likely agree that the conduct of a coffee
business has no relation to the spiritual health of either the congregation or the
greater community. In such a case, there would be little difficulty in
distinguishing religious purpose from commercial purpose.
Nevertheless, the facts could easily become more complicated. Imagine that
the church opened the coffeehouse not in order to make a profit but in order to
attract a youthful demographic and to proselytize to them. This particular coffee
house distributes religious pamphlets in each food sack, plays Christian rock
music, has Bibles on every table for reading, and posts announcements regarding
Bible study and other opportunities for Christian fellowship. In such a case, the
church would have a colorable argument that the initiation and conduct of the
business has a substantial causal relationship to its religious purpose (other than
production of revenue). However, the IRS has shown a willingness to make fine
distinctions regarding what is related and unrelated. Consider this passage from
an analogous case:
The operation of your gift shop is unrelated because the operation of the
shop normally bears no causal relationship to your exempt functions
other than through the production of income. However ....

[w]hen an

item is of religious significance in the Z church, its sale bears a causal
relationship to your exempt functions and is a related activity. 26
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In other words, the IRS makes distinctions on a product-by-product basis.
The sale of coffee, the IRS would say, has no inherently religious purpose.
Therefore, even given the religious motivation for opening the coffee shop, it is
likely the IRS would regard income from the sale of coffee as unrelated and
deem the net income in respect to the sale of coffee as unrelated business taxable
income (UBTI). Presumably, however, any income from the sale of crucifixes
would not be UBTI.
This sort of official discrimination between the religious and secular is
constitutionally suspect. 26 ' The only way for the IRS to distinguish a religious
item from a secular item is to investigate the item's relation to the organization's
doctrine. Yet the Court has eschewed this sort of investigation 268 and has found
fault in programs that require such an investigation. 269
In addition to the problem of defining the religious purpose, there is the
problem of how to define the activity. Is the church selling coffee or
proselytizing? Is it possible to separate the two? What are the standards that
should guide the resolution of such a question?
There is also the problem of what sort of causal connection is sufficient. The
regulations require there to be a "substantial" causal relationship,27 ° which,
although a less demanding standard than a "but-for" test, is still nebulous enough
to afford the IRS wide discretion. Must the commercial activity be a necessary
means of accomplishing its religious purpose? A reasonable means? A rational
means? Seemingly, the coffee sales would not exist but for the chance to
proselytize, but there are ways to proselytize without selling coffee. Thus,
opening a coffee shop cannot be seen as necessary but could be seen as
reasonably or rationally related to a church's purpose. Although these problems
arise with respect to any organization subject to the UBIT, other exempt
organizations do not have the favored constitutional status of religious
organizations, and courts have not been as reticent to define and circumscribe the
purpose of other organizations. Therefore, these systemic problems may be of
constitutional significance with respect to religious organizations.
However, there is an argument that the UBIT is not constitutionally infirm.
When the IRS suspects that a religious organization is conducting an unrelated
business, it could ask the religious organization to state the content of its firstorder beliefs, accepting the organization's statement as conclusive. In this way,
the organization, not the IRS, defines the limits of its own belief system. Then, it
could ask the religious organization to state the claimed causal connection
267. See supra Part IV.5. Note that there is no constitutional barrier to inquiring and discriminating
between items related and unrelated to a garden-variety charitable purpose, such as liberal education or cultural
development.
268. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (noting that what
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(1971).
270. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2).

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38

between those first-order beliefs and the activity at issue (other than the need for
funds). The IRS would then have just one task: to determine whether the claimed
causal connection is substantial. The first two inquiries involve questions of fact,
not questions of religion. Evaluating the sincerity of a claimed belief involves no
inquiry into or discrimination of religious belief. The third question, despite its
superficial factual appearance, is actually a normative question. That is, a
substantial connection should be defined by reference to the policy animating the
requirement. That policy is irrelevant to the organization's religious beliefs.
Therefore, this methodology could be constitutionally viable.
Assuming this approach avoids excessive entanglement with respect to the
question of whether an organization generates unrelated business taxable income,
the question then becomes whether the ongoing administration of the UBIT
would create an excessive entanglement. Although the UBIT necessitates a
continuing financial relationship, subjects religious organizations to audit, and
requires disclosure of financial transactions, the scope of those entanglements is a
great deal less than that occasioned by a full-scale income tax. The governmental
scrutiny would be focused on a specific aspect of the religious organization's
financial life; a full-scale income tax would entail global scrutiny of the
organization's finances. Similarly, the organization would be required to disclose
information regarding only transactions it concedes, or are deemed by the IRS or
a court, to be unrelated to its religious purpose. This is not minimal
entanglement, but it is less than a full-scale tax and likely not constitutionally
excessive, particularly in light of the alternative of allowing churches tax-free
profits on all of its activities. Such an alternative would revive the competitive
imbalance that led to the enactment of the UBIT in 1950. That is, freedom from
income taxes would permit religious organizations to reinvest and expand at a
rate impossible for taxable entities and, consequently, place for-profit entities at a
competitive disadvantage. To illustrate, just imagine the Catholic Church
purchasing and running, say, General Motors. In that case, Ford, Toyota,
Daimler-Chrysler, and Honda would be placed immediately at a competitive
disadvantage-the Catholic Church could issue tax-free bonds, reinvest profits
without paying any tax whatsoever on its income and undercut its competitors'
price point.
Relatedly, abolishing the UBIT for religious organizations has the potential
to shrink the tax base commensurate with the amount of commercial activity such
organizations carry on. Depending on how aggressively religious organizations
became in carrying on business activity, the government would stand to lose a
great deal of revenue and, correlatively, individuals and tax-paying organizations
would see their tax burden rise to cover the shortfall. Faced with the alternative,
it seems a lesser evil to allow the IRS some limited entanglement in order to
enforce the UBIT. After all, the UBIT is limited in scope and may be
administered in a way that minimizes or eliminates the intrusiveness of the
relatedness inquiry. Therefore, the UBIT is likely to be upheld against an
excessive entanglement challenge.

2007/Taxing God
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The taxing power is among the most awesome powers a government
possesses. This article analyzed the question whether the exercise of such a
power is compatible with the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of religious liberty:
an issue not often discussed in academic literature. Through a general review of
the history of tax exemptions and a close analysis of the Supreme Court's
Establishment and Free Exercise jurisprudence, this article set forth eight
principles that limit the government's taxing power. Those principles are:
1. Religious organizations must be subject to the same rules as other
organizations.
2. The tax must not have the purpose of promoting or inhibiting
religion.
3. The tax must be imposed on religious organizations at the same rate
as that imposed on other similarly situated organizations.
4. No tax may operate as a prior restraint on religious activity.
5. The government may not make excessive inquiry into the religious
nature of a use or product.
6. There should be appropriate statutory limits on the discretion to
audit.
7. Any tax must not be onerous.
8. A full-scale income tax on churches is constitutionally impermissible.
This article then analyzed the implications of those principles for current law.
It concluded, in short, that the Code in effect today is entirely constitutional.
More specifically, the section 501(c)(3) limitations on political and commercial
activity are valid and the UBIT is constitutional. It also concluded that a typical
property tax would not be unconstitutional as applied to religious organizations.
One would be reasonable to question the practical impact of this analysis and
these conclusions. This article concludes the Code is constitutional, it calls for no
changes in the Code or the Constitution, it does not challenge Supreme Court
precedent and, moreover, Congress and local governments do not seem even
minimally inclined limit the tax benefits conferred on religious organizations.
Nevertheless, this article has theoretical and practical significance.
On the theoretical side, this article helps to clarify the source of tax exemption for churches by introducing and describing the distinction between statutory
tax exemption and constitutional tax exemption for religious organizations. It has
often been said that deductions and exemptions are not rights but privileges.27'
This could be taken to mean that what Congress giveth to churches, Congress
may taketh away. That is, I contend, generally correct but has the potential to
271.
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paint a misleading picture with respect to churches. Congress did not grant
churches income-tax exemption; rather, the Constitution (as interpreted by the
Supreme Court) granted such exemption in the first instance. By the same token,
the Constitution did not grant religious organizations the ability to receive
deductible contributions or issue tax-exempt bonds; rather, Congress alone has
granted those benefits. Once one is clear on what exactly Congress has given and
what exactly the Constitution has given, a richer and more nuanced theoretical
picture of the tax-exempt universe becomes possible.
On the practical side, this distinction clarifies the locus and stakes of the
debate regarding the proper contours of the Code's exemption regime. The
debate is not about whether churches should be exempt from the federal income
tax, for churches must be exempt. As a result, the tax-exemption for churches
would never be at stake in any proposed change to the Code. Accordingly, the
attention of observers and participants should shift to the actual issues involved.
The most important issue for judicial clarification is the definition of
"religion" for constitutional purposes. Does the Code incorporate the term in its
constitutional sense? As it pertains to exemption from the federal income tax,
section 501(c)(3) is superfluous for churches; for other organizations, including
perhaps nonchurch religious organizations, section 501(c)(3) is the source of
their exemption. On the other hand, no organization, even a church, is constitutionally entitled to receive deductible contributions or tax-exempt financing.
Thus, the definition of a religious organization for section 170 purposes and
501(c)(3) purposes remains a matter of great importance for religious
organizations.
The important issues for political resolution are (1) what sorts of
organizations should be able to obtain tax-exempt financing, (2) should incometax deductions be granted to donors to religious organizations, and (3) what
conditions should the donee organization have to satisfy in order to secure tax
deductions to the donor?
In this light, the All Saints' Episcopal Church dispute can be seen for what it
truly is: a dispute not about whether All Saints will be income-tax exempt but
about whether the donors to All Saints may continue deduct their contributions
under section 170 and whether tax-exempt financing will be available to All
Saints. This is not a revolutionary shift of emphasis, but it highlights the different
principles and practical considerations that apply to the academic and political
debate at the intersection of tax and religion.

